The CAPRi Program is one of several Inter-Center Initiatives of the CGIAR and aims to promote comparative research on the role played by property and collective action institutions in shaping the
INTRODUCTION
The scientific community has made considerable progress in understanding variation in collection action. Once the possibility for divergence between individual and social goods was recognized (Hardin 1968; Olson 1971 Olson [1965 ), many scholars and policy analysts saw prisoners' dilemmas and tragedies of the commons everywhere. The supposed ubiquity of collective action problems justified nationalization or privatization of renewable natural resources around the world.
2 Yet, important differences exist among the types of collective action problems that individuals and communities confront. It is important that we begin to identify conditions that facilitate or hinder collective action.
Collective action is not problematic under all circumstances. Problems arise from inadequate information, conflicting interests, or the nature of the good itself. Game theorists have developed a variety of basic games to capture common aspects of social interaction. Several types of collective action problems exist that have relevance for natural resource management. When people lack information, coordination becomes difficult despite common goals (assurance games). Use and maintenance activities need to be coordinated to avoid crowding or achieve economies of scale. If multiple solutions exist to a collective action problem but have different distributional consequences, 1 The IFRI research program involves the study of forests, people, and institutions by a network of Collaborating Research Centers (CRCs) in 13 countries. The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change are jointly responsible for coordination of this program. Funding from the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the FAO is gratefully acknowledged. 2 See Ostrom (1990) for a discussion and critique of these two approaches to natural resource management.
competition over distributional issues can result in failures to cooperate (chicken games).
The beneficiaries of alternative management strategies are often vastly different, for example, making agreement and cooperation difficult to achieve (battle of the sexes games). Rivalry in consumption and difficulty of exclusion make provision and sustenance of common-pool goods particularly challenging (social dilemma gamesmore specifically, common-pool resource games). Obstacles to exclusion encourage individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others. Difficulty of exclusion and rivalry of extraction characterize many natural resource systems, including forests, watersheds, and fisheries. These conditions can result in under-provision of management and degradation of common resources.
Although collective action problems differ in severity, many case studies (Baland and Platteau 2000 [1996] ; Bromley, et al. 1992; McCay and Acheson 1990; Ostrom 1990 ) and evidence from laboratory experiments (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; Ostrom 2000; Udéhn 1993, 254 -256) demonstrate that many varieties of collective action problems can be overcome. The on-going challenge is to better understand sources of variation in the success of collective action. A large number of factors have been identified as facilitating collective action, including characteristics of the collective problem, 3 characteristics of the group, institutional arrangements, technology, and the actions of national governments and other external actors . 4 Despite significant progress, many questions about prospects for collective action have yet to be solved. Lists of important variables differ (Agrawal 2001) . Debates continue about whether and how particular factors, especially group size and heterogeneity, affect prospects for successful collective action (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Baland and Platteau 1999; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002; Gibson and Koontz 1998; Johnson and Libecap 1982; Quiggin 1993; Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999; Varughese and Ostrom 2001) . And there is little consensus on the relative importance of explanatory factors or the nature and significance of interactions among them. The variety and number of factors associated with successful collective action, while encouraging for social relations, makes analysis difficult.
Efforts to resolve puzzles about collective action through empirical research confront two major obstacles. First, the key factors expected to affect collective action and the outcomes of collective action are inconsistently conceptualized and measured.
Inconsistent terminology and measurements may obscure consistent patterns or suggest patterns where none exist. Second, the scarcity of comparable data makes it impossible to evaluate the relative importance of many of the variables identified in the literature as likely to influence collective action. Case studies are extremely important to an understanding that collective action is feasible, but case study authors tend to identify different variables to study and making the findings from case studies comparable is extremely difficult.
Contributions of empirical research to the study of collective action will be limited unless the challenges of conceptual consistency and comparable data can be overcome. This paper describes an ambitious effort to meet these dual challenges: the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. To accumulate a large number of cases on a comprehensive set of variables, an international network of research centers was created, consisting of scholars committed to using the IFRI protocols in data collection and contributing their data to a common database. To achieve consistency of concepts and empirical measurement, IFRI researchers developed a common set of data collection instruments and common methods of data collection.
The remainder of the paper is organized in five parts. First, we provide an overview of the IFRI research program. The second section concerns the need for comparable data and how the IFRI research strategy helps meet that need by building a sizeable database of comparable cross-national data more quickly than would have been possible for any single researcher or research center. We discuss the challenges of conceptual consistency and empirical measurement, and how researchers have used IFRI protocols to study collective action and various factors expected to influence success, in the third section. Despite the progress made, IFRI continues to struggle with conceptual consistency and the difficulty of analyzing complex processes. The fourth section identifies several such issues. Fifth, we summarize and conclude.
THE INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONS (IFRI) RESEARCH PROGRAM
The IFRI research program engages an international network of scholars in longterm, comparative research on forests, the people who use forest resources, and institutions for forest management (Ostrom 1998) . 5 IFRI grew out of on-going efforts to study collective action for the management of common-pool resources. An initial database drew upon existing case studies -mostly about fisheries, groundwater basins, and irrigation systems -and provided the basis for Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990 IFRI brings to the empirical study of collective action an international database of comparable studies from all over the world, with comparability ensured by the use of a common research framework and methodology.
IFRI AND THE CHALLENGE OF COMPARABLE DATA
In a recent review of research on common-pool resources, Agrawal (2001) identified 33 separate explanatory factors that have been repeatedly identified in the literature as important. Given the large body of literature confirming the potential influence of each variable, he contends that analysis that excludes any of these factors should at least discuss the likely biases of the missing variables. Inclusion of such a large number of variables, however, in most statistical analyses is not feasible, barring the use of Boolean algebra (Ragin 1987) or very large data sets subject to multivariate analysis.
Multivariate analysis can incorporate numerous variables, but a much larger number of data points are required to reliably assess relationships.
The empirical complexity of many variables of interest implies that substantial investments in fieldwork are required to obtain reliable data; as a result, scholars have been hard-pressed to build large databases for the study of common-pool resources.
Large databases can be built by coding existing studies, as demonstrated by Tang (1992) and Schlager (1994) . Since existing empirical studies typically address only a subset of the factors identified in the literature, missing data inevitably limits analysis. This sort of analysis also confronts differences in conceptualization and the empirical measurement of variables by different authors. Some researchers have collected data on relatively large sets of cases (Bardhan 2000; Dayton-Johnson 2000; Lam 1998; Jodha 1990; Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002) . Ultimately, since there are limits to the time and financing available for data collection, a trade-off exists between the number and type of variables measured and the number of cases for which data can be collected. Careful sampling can control for some set of factors and limit the degree of bias likely in results. Nonetheless, it may not be possible to control for all variables excluded from data collection and analysis. And controlling for variables leaves many interesting questions un-addressed.
Organization as a network of research centers facilitates comparative research.
Members of the IFRI research network collect data on a common set of variables, 7 use the same methods for data collection, and share data in a growing international database, 7 IFRI represents the core, not the limits, of data collection. Many IFRI research teams collect supplemental data to address specific research questions.
thereby maintaining the comparability required for cross-national analysis. By early 2002, data for 173 sites with 264 forests, 302 forest user groups, and 614 forest products had been entered into IFRI's common database. 8 The relative breadth of variables included in the IFRI protocols and relatively large number of data points in the database enables more complex multivariate analysis than would otherwise be possible.
THE CHALLENGE OF CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSISTENCY
If empirical research is to contribute to further progress in understanding conditions favorable for collective action, greater clarity will need to be achieved in the conceptualization of the unit of analysis, conceptualization of dependent and independent variables, and in how these concepts are operationalized for data collection and analysis.
COLLECTIVE ACTION BY WHOM?
For most discussions of collective action, "the group" is the unit of analysis. For research concerning natural resources, this means "the group that uses the resource" or "the user group." In theoretical work and empirical studies, the group is often a point of departure rather than subject of inquiry. 9 Yet, in actual data collection, people do not present themselves to researchers in unambiguously demarcated groups. Rather, empirical researchers have to determine how to conceptualize -and recognize in the field -the relevant set of people for analyzing the problem of collective action.
In the abstract, it is simple enough to say that the relevant group includes individuals who face a collective action problem -which is to say, who share some 8 Updates of the common database occur periodically, as new data comes in from collaborating research centers. 9 But see Agrawal and Gibson (1999) and Turner (1999) IFRI's distinction between user groups and forest associations greatly facilitates the empirical study of collective action. It provides a common standard unit for observing and measuring potential collective action. It also ensures the collection of data about groups that have overcome collective action problems as well as those that have not.
Since groups may act collectively for some but not all aspects of forest management, this modular approach to collective action also facilitates analysis that distinguishes among types of collective action (see below). IFRI's use of commonality in rights and responsibility relative to a forest as the defining characteristic of a user group is less helpful for research concerned with the scope of collective action or about the "community" as the social unit of analysis.
IS THIS GROUP ACTING COLLECTIVELY?
The difficulty of recognizing informal institutions and discerning the effectiveness of formal institutions on forest conditions represents an important challenge for institutional analysis. Biophysical data on forest conditions can be used to discern the effectiveness of collective action for forest management. If forest users have developed rules of forest management, whether formal or informal, and those rules effectively alter behavior (i.e., they are "rules-in-use"), changes will occur in the patterns of forest use.
IFRI's research strategy involves the collection of descriptions of rules and evaluations of their effectiveness through interviews and participatory sessions, plus the collection of data on forest conditions. With both social and biophysical data, it becomes possible to check social scientific data about rules for management against biophysical data on forest conditions.
In general, harvesters of forest products are expected to engage in optimal foraging strategies unless rules-in-use constrain their behavior. Optimal foraging implies that humans follow a cost-benefit calculus in their harvesting behavior. First, they will use forest products that are the most valuable (in terms of yield minus cost of extraction).
When the value of forest products does not vary with location, then optimal foraging implies that the most accessible resources will be harvested first. All else equal, proximity to settlements and to roads lowers the cost of extraction. Steep slopes, impassible rivers, and other physical impediments increase the difficulty of extraction, and are usually utilized after more geographically accessible areas. In the absence of institutions that alter patterns of forest use, the biophysical data should reveal evidence of extraction that reflects proximity and physical accessibility. Smaller, younger trees should be found closer to settlements and roads, and in flatter areas, with larger, older trees deeper in the forest and on steeper slopes. If effective institutions for forest management are in place, however, the institutions alter the cost-benefit calculus.
Depending on the nature of the management rules, patterns of harvesting should change in ways that will be measured biophysical data from forest plots. further away from the capital city strongly supports a general sense that levels of enforcement decrease with distance from Kampala.
In Bolivia, deviations from use patterns associated with optimal foraging among the Yuracaré challenged assumptions that such indigenous peoples lack systems for forest management (Becker and Léon 2000) . In the early 1990s, the Bolivian government adopted a policy that allows indigenous people to gain formal title to their territories, but requires that they first develop a formal management plan for the forest resources. The policy suggests the absence of indigenous systems for forest management. Data from forests managed by the Yuracaré revealed that they do have an effective system for managing fruit trees, but have not yet devised rules for managing timber resources.
Building upon the existing system makes more sense in this situation than developing a management plan from scratch, as called for by government policy.
In contrast, evidence that extraction closely matched patterns associated with optimal foraging bolstered Gibson's claim that two villages in Guatemala lacked institutions for forest management (2001). Villagers might not report rules about forest management because they were suspicious of outsiders, or the researchers might fail to recognize informal rules, but the biophysical evidence eases such doubts about the lack of social scientific evidence of rules. Where biophysical evidence of optimal foraging confirms that communities truly lack rules for forest management, external intervention could raise awareness of indirect benefits associated with forest conservation and encourage the development of rules for forest management. After an IFRI study in Loma Alta, Ecuador revealed the absence of local institutions for forest management and a lack of appreciation for the forest's role in watershed protection, a series of participatory studies organized by a non-government organization demonstrated dramatic differences in fog interception associated with variable forest conditions (Becker 1999) . The villagers subsequently decided to protect a portion of their forest for watershed management.
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR WHAT?
Collective action can take many forms, including the development of institutions (e.g., rules for resource management), resource mobilization (e.g., to hire guards or invest in maintenance activities), coordination of activities (e.g., to avoid crowding), and For analysis of 12 sites in North Bengal, India, Chakrabarti et al. (2001) developed an index based on collective action on a set of 18 forest management activities (e.g., planting seedlings, harvesting, marketing of forest products). For this index, a group earns 0.5 points for each management activity for which it has adopted a rule; actual coordination on implementation of collective rules earns 1.0 point per activity. This analysis also found a positive correlation between forest conditions and levels of collective action. Higher levels of collective action were more common in communities with prior experience with self-governance through Panchayati Raj institutions, and in communities with greater heterogeneity in wealth and education.
Another set of studies focuses on collective action for the mobilization of resources required for effective monitoring and enforcement of rules for forest management. Monitoring and enforcement is costly. In some communities, responsibility for guarding rotates among households. Other communities raise funds to hire individuals to guard forest resources on behalf of the community. For the community to hire guards, it must mobilize resources for this collective goal (Agrawal 2000; Agrawal and Goyal 2001) . Hiring a guard is a lumpy good; the guard must be retained for a minimal number of months to effectively protect forest resources. A series of articles about forest councils in Kumaon, India measures collective action in terms of resource mobilization as the monetary value of the contribution per household, the group budget for protection, or the number of months each community was able to pay the guard (Agrawal 2000; Agrawal and Goyal 2001) . These studies revealed a curvilinear relationship between group size and collective action for resource mobilization: the smallest groups had less success than somewhat larger groups in mobilizing the resources requiring for forest protection.
The IFRI research network has not limited its attention to any single form of collective action. Openness makes the research program attractive to a variety of scholars with overlapping but not identical research questions. Diversity of approaches has merit; comparisons of alternative conceptualizations of hypothesized relationship can help advance knowledge more rapidly. The lack of consistency in measurement of collective action does raise the risk of miscommunication between scholars who use the same terms to describe somewhat different phenomena. Clear explanations of variables and how they have been measured offer the best defense against miscommunication.
WHAT AFFECTS COLLECTIVE ACTION?
The conceptual and empirical challenges related to independent variables that may affect the likelihood of collective action are even more extreme. When scholars debate the importance of group size, for instance, it is not clear that a common frame of reference exists. Is a group of 100 individuals large or small? What about a group of 1000 individuals, or of 50? Likewise, scholars concerned about the implications of heterogeneity for collective active discuss a number of different forms of group diversity (Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Keohane and Ostrom 1995) . Many studies on heterogeneity focus on economic inequality, but even economic inequality may refer to either income or assets (Baland and Platteau 1999; Quiggin 1993; Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999) . Others have examined heterogeneity in values (Gibson and Koontz 1998) , of knowledge and skills (Johnson and Libecap 1982) , of location (Ostrom 1996; Varughese 1999; Varughese and Ostrom 2001) , or of interest in maintaining the resource.
It is not at all obvious how one should compare findings from studies that use the same The IFRI strategy has not eliminated all challenges, nor is it possible to do so. Despite the accumulation of IFRI data, only a few IFRI studies have attempted to use data from multiple countries (Poteete 2001; Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom 1999) .
Many IFRI publications concern either a single case or a paired comparison (Gibson McKean and Ostrom 2000) . IFRI colleagues who have completed a larger number of sites have begun to do multivariate analyses, but usually limit themselves to data from their own sites ( Comparative analysis that includes forest condition as the dependent variable or as an important independent variable depends upon techniques or proxy measurements that allow comparisons across ecological zones. Even for analyses that do not include biophysical data, differences in culture and policy environment across countries may affect outcomes. Indeed, inclusion of dummy variables for Uganda, the USA, and Nepal revealed noteworthy country-specific effects on efforts by user groups to exclude others from forest resources (Poteete 2001) . Limitations to comparability do not make crossnational analysis impossible, but do make it more difficult. The analytical difficulty of cross-national analysis and the possibility of context-specific patterns are just two good arguments in favor of a strategy of testing hypotheses first with data from a single country, and then scaling up to cross-national analysis.
The potential of the IFRI network does not depend solely upon an increase in cross-national analysis. Communication about findings within the network enhances their incorporation into the design of future studies. Regular communication about research activities depends upon declining telecommunication costs, especially for internet access, and more frequent opportunities for face-to-face exchange. Regular synthesis of findings identifies emerging themes, disseminate findings to a larger audience, and influence future studies.
CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to write a "concluding section" when one is describing the efforts of an on-going research program to solve extremely challenging puzzles that underlie all efforts to build systematic knowledge about collective action. Users of forestry resources are interacting with complexly, adapting ecological systems and are themselves a part of a human, complex, adaptive systems. Both ecological and human systems exist at multiple scales over time. Consequently, the challenge for all researchers and policy analysts is to gain a slow accumulation of knowledge about the processes within these complex systems and how they adapt to change over time.
The International Forestry Resources and Institutions research program is an effort to use a consistent set of concepts and ways of measuring these concepts in order to facilitate the long-term understanding of collective action processes as related to forests.
The effort has already produced a better understanding of how the heterogeneity of users can lead to strong distributional effects (Poteete 2001 ) that can be offset to some extent by rules designed to provide different roles, duties, and benefits to different groups of users (Varughese 1999) . We have learned that whether individuals are motivated to think about engaging in collective action is strongly affected by their perceptions of the condition of a resource -not by the "actual" condition (Agrawal 2000; Gibson, Lehoucq, and Williams 2002; Gibson and Becker 2000; Tucker 1999 ). Those perceptions can in turn be changed by a variety of techniques that give more accurate feedback to users about the functioning of the relevant ecosystem and its condition (Becker 1999) . We have learned that distance between a forest and a large urban area has several impacts on forest conditions including the capacity to monitor harvesting rates as well as the cost of transporting forest products (Banana, Gombya-Ssembajjwe and Bahati 2001) . And, we have learned many other interesting relationships that we and other scholars will continue to explore in the coming years as we all try to gain clearer conceptions of key variables and processes and find better ways of measuring them.
